Do Public Perceptions Reflect the Realities of EU-China Relations?

Source: Global Times & ICES

Commentary by Linsheng Hong, Research and Management Associate, ICES

January 29, 2026

ECFR and Global Times surveys show pragmatic public perceptions on both sides, with China viewed in Europe mainly as a necessary partner and the EU seen in China as a major power. Yet despite these relatively positive mutual perceptions, the EU’s China policy remains uncertain, as it is increasingly shaped by the pursuit of strategic autonomy.

When Trump announced the sweeping tariffs towards the world in early 2025, there was speculation that China and Europe might move closer together. That did not happen. During the second half of 2025, the relationship instead became more rocky, with rare earth export controls and the still ongoing Nexperia saga casting a shadow over bilateral ties.

At the beginning of 2026, Trump once again escalated tensions with Europe by announcing his intention to acquire Greenland for the price of $700 billion, not excluding the use of “military force.” For European countries unwilling to align with him, a punitive tariff of 10 per cent was proposed over the weekend. European think tankers, diplomats and scholars have since debated the possible activation of anti-coercion instruments, tariffs on American goods worth USD 93 billion, and the activation of Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union, despite doubt over whether any of these measures would ever be invoked. Although Trump later walked back his remarks on the possible use of military force and the imposition of tariffs at the Davos Forum, the threat nevertheless destabilised NATO's role as a security guarantee for European countries and exposed widening chasms in the “rules-based” international order.

Whether this context creates new space for the EU and China to engage more constructively and pragmatically remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the recent surveys published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and the Global Times (GT) in China offer some insights into public perceptions shaping this evolving landscape.

European Public Opinion on China

According to surveys from both institutions, European public opinion towards China is neither strongly hostile nor uncritically positive. Instead, it is largely neutral and shaped by expectations of China’s long-term rise and by uncertainty in transatlantic relations. The ECFR survey, conducted in November 2025 among 26,000 respondents across 21 countries, including 15 in Europe, shows that Europeans are more likely to view China as a necessary partner than as a rival or adversary. About 45 per cent describe China as a necessary partner, compared with 24 per cent who see it as a rival and 8 per cent as an adversary. More than half of European respondents also favour stable or improved relations with China, with 25 per cent hoping for closer ties and 26 per cent preferring relations to remain strong and unchanged. This pattern is aligned with data from GT’s Global Survey on Impression and Understanding of China, which collects 51,689 responses from 46 countries. Among respondents in seven EU countries, 43.3 per cent report a good overall impression of China, while 45.3 per cent express a neutral view.

Chinese Public Opinion on Europe

From the Chinese perspective, Europe is viewed in relatively non-confrontational terms and as a major global power. According to ECFR data, 61 per cent of Chinese respondents regard the United States as a threat, compared with only 19 per cent who hold the same view of the EU. Nearly half describe the EU as a partner, while the United States is more often labelled a rival. China is also among the few countries where a significant share of respondents continue to view the EU as a major power, at 36 per cent. These findings are consistent with the GT’s China-EU Mutual Perception survey, which polled 16,300 respondents between October and November across 20 EU countries. The survey shows that 38.9 per cent of Chinese respondents express optimism about the EU’s future global influence, alongside relatively high levels of familiarity with and interest in Europe.

These surveys also highlight the role of the United States in shaping perceptions in both Europe and China. ECFR data show a widening transatlantic perception gap, with only 16 per cent of EU respondents describing the United States as an ally and many expressing doubts about Europe’s ability to act as a fully equal geopolitical power. The China-EU Mutual Perception survey adds that respondents in both China and 20 EU countries identify US influence and pressure as the main obstacle to closer China-EU relations. Among EU respondents, 36.1 per cent cite US influence as the primary constraint, compared with 47.6 per cent among Chinese respondents.

Gaps between Perceptions and Policy Realities

The mutual perceptions among the public, at least in surveys, are improving; yet, the EU is moving at an ever faster pace to build its self-resilience by diversifying and upgrading its partnerships with countries such as India Vietnam and tightening regulatory rules that will affect Chinese industries operating within the EU. Recent discussions on ​​imposing duties on Chinese hybrid vehicles, a new proposed cybersecurity package that would affect Chinese-led industries such as connected cars, solar panels, surveillance equipment and security scanners, as well as European Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security Maroš Šefčovič’s call to reform the most-favoured-nation principle at the WTO, have all added another layer of uncertainty to bilateral relations.

As the EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen put it at the World Economic Forum, setting nostalgia aside, the EU should treat geopolitical shocks as an opportunity to build a more independent Europe. How the EU pursues its strategic autonomy amid these profound shifts will arguably directly shape its China policy and EU-China relations, though the direction of adjustment remains uncertain and is likely to involve a period of experimentation and recalibration.