ICES | Closed-Door Roundtable with Experts on EU-China Relations

Hosted by the Institute for China-Europe Studies (ICES)

June 22, 2026 · 14:00–16:00 CET

Introduction

On 22 June 2026, the Institute for China-Europe Studies (ICES) convened a roundtable on EU-China relations. The discussion boiled down to 6 main areas and suggestions that could inform prospective EU-China interactions:

I. The imperative of creating new political narratives for the EU-China relationship

Current descriptions of the relationship, such as the EU's 'partner, competitor, rival' framework, were largely designed for domestic audiences and to explain how the other side affects internal interests, rather than to capture the nature of the relationship itself. This has contributed to friction across the broader relationship. Terms such as 'de-risking,' 'reciprocity,' and 'economic security' also need vocabulary that better captures their essence, as they are often interpreted differently by the two sides and can trigger strong resistance. This shows that language itself has become a source of tension, and that more careful framing is needed to preserve space for engagement.

A more constructive language for describing EU-China relations could benefit both sides. A revised narrative framework does not need to avoid difficult issues, but it should express them in a way that allows cooperation to continue. Such a framework needs to be grounded in the recognition that the EU and China do not have irreconcilable conflicts of security interests.

II. Adopt a comprehensive, flexible negotiation approach in EU-China engagement

EU-China engagement could benefit from recognising the growing interconnectedness between different policy areas. Security is no longer limited to traditional hard security concerns, but increasingly includes energy, food, trade, supply chains, emerging technologies, and questions of dependency and resilience. Economic statecraft has blurred the boundaries between policy domains, with one sector often being used as leverage to obtain concessions in another.

In this context, treating issues as strictly separate may be counterproductive. A more comprehensive approach would therefore help both sides better understand how tensions in one area may affect the wider relationship.

III. Establish more frequent, inclusive, and technically grounded communication channels

Improving predictability and mutual understanding requires more regular, inclusive, and technical communication channels between the EU and China. On the European side, more frequent high-level visits to Beijing, and a clear identification of 'who speaks for the EU' could help reduce misunderstandings and build trust. On the Chinese side, it would be useful to ensure that more accurate and nuanced assessments of European institutional dynamics could be prepared before policies and official reactions are formulated or announced. For both, technical-level exchanges involving officials, experts, businesses, and subnational actors would help clarify policy intentions before tensions escalate.

This is particularly important because institutional fragmentation complicates communication on both sides. The EU is a sui generis entity, where different senior officials, member states, and institutions may hold competing priorities or send mixed signals. This can appear unclear and unpredictable to Beijing, whose decision-making process is often viewed as more top-down. Yet analogous complexity also exists within China, where different levels of government and policy actors may interpret and implement central guidance in varying ways. More frequent and better-structured communication would therefore help both sides understand not only each other's official positions, but also the institutional complexities behind them. At the same time, top-level strategic communications between both sides always remain indispensable.

IV. Regional and sector-based cooperation could help build trust from the ground up

EU-China cooperation could also be advanced through bottom-up engagement, including at the regional and sectoral levels. Such practical channels could help build trust where broader political agreement remains difficult. The EU consists of 27 member states, and even when policies are defined at the European Commission level, national and regional authorities often retain room to interpret, implement, and adapt them according to local priorities. Likewise, China has 34 provincial-level regions, each with its own economic profile and scope for external cooperation. If a major political bargain at the national level remains out of reach, both sides could start with smaller, more practical forms of cooperation. Regional partnerships, city-level exchanges, and sector-specific projects may provide a more manageable way to rebuild confidence and generate concrete outcomes.

V. Use more incentives rather than only restrictive measures

Carrots may go further than sticks. From Beijing's perspective, EU initiatives such as the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act and the Proposal for a revised Cybersecurity Act are still seen as 'stick' policies that may discourage Chinese companies from investing in Europe. At the same time, the Chinese State Council Provisions on Industrial and Supply Chain Security, as well as its Provisions on Countering Foreign Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, are viewed by European companies operating in China as strong disincentives.

While these developments may appear to reflect a bilateral pattern of tit-for-tat measures, they should also be understood within the broader restructuring of the global economy. The EU and the United States are seeking to protect their industrial bases, while China is trying to upgrade its manufacturing capacity and reduce external dependencies. In this emerging paradigm, tensions are likely to increase, as the strategic objectives of the different actors may clash at times.

VI. Prevent trade and regulatory tensions from becoming a wider political conflict

The EU-China relationship could benefit from utilising mechanisms (such as the possible Trade and Investment Consultation Mechanism) to prevent trade disputes from escalating into a broader political confrontation. Regulatory frictions over public procurement, subsidies, cybersecurity, investment barriers, and supply chains could be effectively addressed through early-warning mechanisms, technical consultations, and business feedback channels. These mechanisms would allow Brussels and Beijing to manage competition without allowing it to turn into a trade war. Even if structural tensions cannot be fully resolved, both sides can still buy time, keep channels open, and preserve space for future cooperation.

Conclusion

Relations between Brussels and Beijing are in a period of strategic opportunity: For the European public, China is not an existential threat, nor is the EU's China policy a matter of European identity, at least for now. In this context, targeted technical solutions can provide marginal improvement and buy time for both parties to pursue their individual strategic goals until the time is right to address the major issues in the relationship.