Dear ICES friends,
We are delighted to present the latest issue of the quarterly ICES Maritime Bulletin.
The maritime domain has become a new frontier in international affairs, one that holds the potential
for both rivalry and cooperation. Few issues cut across borders as sharply as those tied to the
seas, from fisheries and resources to shipping lanes, climate impacts, maritime security and international
law.
At ICES, we believe that regular knowledge-sharing is essential for transforming
these challenges into opportunities for constructive engagement between Europe, China, and the
wider international community. Every quarter, the ICES Maritime Bulletin brings you the latest
developments, emerging insights, and top event highlights in the maritime sphere. We invite you
to explore the key stories and perspectives shaping this dynamic frontier.
NEWS ROUND
MARITIME DISPUTES & SECURITY
On October 10, the EU and partner countries in the G7 and Nordic-Baltic 8++ issued a joint statement through their shared Shadow Fleet Task Force pledging closer coordination to counter unsafe, illicit, and sanction-evading shipping practices that threaten maritime safety and international norms.
On October 12, 2025, a Chinese coast guard vessel and Philippine government boats clashed with each other near the disputed Thitu Island in the South China Sea, with Manila saying the Chinese ship used water cannons and rammed a Philippine vessel, and Beijing asserting its actions were lawful efforts to expel ships it said had entered waters it claims. joint statement
On November 12, members of the European Parliament moved to strengthen the mandate and resources of the European Maritime Safety Agency, citing growing risks from shadow fleets, hybrid threats, and geopolitical instability at sea.
On November 20, Philippine officials stated that Manila is seeking deeper cooperation with the European Union on maritime security and capacity-building amid rising tensions with China in the South China Sea.
Also on November 20, the European External Action Service released a statement noting that critical maritime infrastructure components (including submarine cables, pipelines, LNG platforms, and ports) are becoming increasingly vulnerable to hybrid threats.
On November 21 2025, EU ministers and Indo-Pacific partners underlined stepped-up European defence engagement in the region at the 4th EU–Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum reflecting a broader trend of increased European naval presence and signalling in the Indo-Pacific documented across 2025.
In November, security dynamics in the Red Sea showed tentative signs of easing,, with Yemen’s Houthis appearing to scale back attacks on commercial shipping while EU naval forces intervened to free a tanker crew seized by Somali pirates, underscoring continued but shifting maritime risks in the Red Sea trading lanes critical to Europe-Asia trade.
On December 3, China and Russia conducted a joint air patrol over the East China Sea and western Pacific as part of their ongoing military cooperation, illustrating sustained coordination that has implications for broader maritime security dynamics.
On December 13, Philippine authorities reported that three fishermen were injured after Chinese coast guard vessels used water cannons during another hostile encounter near a disputed shoal in the South China Sea. China maintained that its actions were legally precedented and necessary to enforce maritime regulations in waters it claims.
On December 15, the EU issued a statement condemning recent “dangerous actions” in the South China Sea, reiterating its support for freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes under international law.
In December, analysts from Chatham House argued that with the U.S. reassessing its security role in the Arctic, the United Kingdom and other European allies may need to take on a more active role in northern maritime security as Russia’s presence and strategic interests in the high north grow concurrently.
ICES Commentary
Commentary by Alec Caruana, ICES Research Associate (Non-Resident) December 16, 2025
Earlier this spring, the Houthi Movement in Yemen’s escalation of attacks
on commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea drew global attention to the wider maritime environment
of the Western Indian Ocean. While these raids drew concern across the world over their impact
on global supply chains, Washington’s intervention provoked unease in European capitals for
more profound reasons. In the course of U.S. deliberations over a potential military response,
a private Signal chat between senior Trump administration officials was leaked, revealing
candid assessments
of Europe’s dependencies on Indian Ocean trade routes: “I just hate bailing Europe out again.”
Vice-President JD Vance wrote, with his colleague in the Pentagon, Pete Hegseth responding,
“I fully share your loathing of European freeloading. It’s pathetic.”
As 2025
draws to a close, while the regional security environment has shifted significantly,
Europe’s trade with Asia remains vulnerable. Washington’s ostensible
neutering of Iran’s nuclear threat
and success in
brokering a tenuous ceasefire
between Israel and Hamas has contributed to a relative reduction in regional military tensions
in key marginal seas to the Indian Ocean—namely the Red Sea and the Gulf of Hormuz. However,
piracy and other forms of maritime insecurity
continue to disrupt shipping
and will continue to pose challenges to consumers and policymakers across Europe and Asia.
With American commitment to securing these arteries demonstrably vacillating and the transatlantic
cooperation over Indian Ocean maritime affairs weakening, exploring how interests align across
east-west lines and what potential could come through enhanced cooperation is certainly warranted.
For most of Europe, the Indian Ocean is not a far-flung or abstract theatre—the
Suez Canal has made the sea significantly interdependent with the Mediterranean, with over
one-third of the EU’s external trade passing through its sea lanes. These vital maritime
shipping lanes connect Europe to energy suppliers in the Persian Gulf, manufacturing hubs
in East Africa and South Asia, and consumer markets in Europe. Nevertheless, Europe’s
substantive maritime engagement remains relatively piecemeal...
Read the full commentary through the title link.
MARITIME GOVERNANCE
On October 12, the European Commission released a statement ahead of an extraordinary meeting of the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) Marine Environment Protection Committeeto deliberate on a pending Net-Zero Framework for the shipping industry, reaffirming the EU’s support for ambitious global measures to decarbonize the sector.
On October 17, the IMO announced it would postpone adoption of its Net-Zero Framework following threats by the United States to increase port fees and visa restrictions on countries voting to approve it, thus delaying binding global emissions rules for shipping as negotiations are set to resume in 2026.
On October 27, a Reuters analysis cautioned that delays in climate-conscious global shipping rules could jeopardize investment in clean marine fuels and slow the sector’s energy transition.
On November 11, China adopted major amendments to its Maritime Law, strengthening provisions related to maritime safety, environmental protection, and enforcement authority, with the changes set to enter into force later in 2026.
On November 19, a report by the Ocean & Climate Platform found that more countries than ever before incorporated ocean-related measures into their annual climate plans under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), though warning that major maritime mitigation opportunities still remain underutilized.
On November 20, shipping industry leaders gathered in Hong Kong for the World Maritime Merchants Forum, where discussions focused on sustainability, supply-chain resilience, and the future of global shipping amid geopolitical uncertainty.
On December 2, Chinese media cited international experts praising China’s contributions to global ocean governance on the heels of the 2025 Symposium on International Maritime Dispute Settlement and International Law, highlighting Beijing’s continued role in maritime cooperation and multilateral ocean initiatives.
Also during the December 8 plenary session, the European Union's delegation to the UN delivered a speech emphasising the bloc's commitment to UNCLOS as the cornerstone of global ocean governance, stressing respect for navigation and coastal states’ rights, highlighting urgent threats from climate change and pollution, and calling for effective implementation of the UN's recently ratified Biological diversity Beyond areas of National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement.
On December 8, during the 80th Plenary Session of the United Nations' General Assembly's discussion on "Oceans and the Law of the Sea," China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Sun Lei, reaffirmed China’s commitment to promoting sustainable ocean development and a "just and reasonable maritime order" under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), while countering "erroneous" interpretations and selective application of the law by other states (like the Philippines and the United States) with respect to the South China Sea.
On December 10, China's Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong delivered a keynote address at the 6th iteration of theSymposium on Global Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance, outlining China’s vision for a rules-based and cooperative maritime order.
On December 11, a World Resources Institute analysis assessed whether 2025’s “super year” for ocean diplomacy delivered meaningful progress, concluding that implementation gaps remain despite expanded political commitments.
On December 24, China deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations for the BBNJ Agreement on marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction, reflecting Beijing’s support for multilateral maritime governance and ocean conservation through the UN system and international law.
On December 29, China's Ministry of Natural Resources released an ecological report covering the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, indicating “illegal fishing and frequent intrusive activities” by the Philippines have threatened the local ecosystem.
ICES Reflections: the Failure of the Net-Zero Shipping Framework
Comment by Alec Caruana, ICES Non-Resident Research Associate
The failure within the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to agree on binding
net-zero shipping rules last October is less a shock than another reminder of how
fragile multilateral climate governance has become in the wake of a multipolar world
where differences are increasingly defined by hard, economic interests rather than
ideological ones.
The negotiations themselves were long, technical, and
hard-fought, unfolding over years of committee meetings and working groups tasked with
translating the IMO’s overall
ambition for the sector—net-zero
emissions from international shipping by around mid-century—into
concrete regulatory measures. These included proposals for mandatory fuel standards, emissions pricing mechanisms,
and incentives to accelerate the uptake of low- and zero-carbon fuels. What finally
collapsed was not the ambition on paper, but agreement on how quickly and how forcefully
the sector should be pushed to decarbonise.
Had they been adopted, the rules
would have begun to reshape fuel choices and vessel investment decisions across the
global shipping company, with particular relevance for emissions-intensive routes such
as Arctic shipping. As traffic along northern sea routes increases, so too do
concerns
about black carbon and other pollutants that disproportionately accelerate ice melt, amplifying
climate impacts far beyond the region itself.
The
fault lines in the negotiations
were familiar. European Union states broadly supported the framework as an actionable, market-based
solution would aid in achieving local climate commitments and provide regulatory certainty
to green shipping industries already emerging in Europe. However, major fossil fuel producing
countries—such as Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the U.S.—led the charge to delay adoption of
the measures, citing undue impact on the economies of fossil fuel-based economies and division
within the committee. The motion to adjourn ultimately succeeded when many key stakeholders
across the global shipbuilding sector—including China, Greece, Cyprus, Panama, and Singapore—moved
to support the delay or abstain from the vote. While many such countries supported the framework
in a preliminary vote last April, they ultimately came to balk at the lack of global consensus
and ambiguous impacts.
Overlaying the episode was a broader geopolitical
reality: a renewed push by the U.S. under President Trump to
MARITIME ECONOMY
Heading into October, the UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) body warned that global maritime trade growth was set to stall for the remainder of the year, citing weak demand, rising costs, and persistent geopolitical disruptions.
In October, enterprise shipping data showed that U.S. container imports remained flat compared to September, reflecting continued trade uncertainty and subdued demand for Asian exports.
On October 21, China’s first direct-to-Europe Arctic container shipping service completed its maiden voyage and announced plans for regular summer 2026 operation, underscoring China’s expanding role in alternative global trade routes that could influence European maritime logistics and shipbuilding strategies.
On October 25, a Chinese report highlighted the South China Sea’s strategic importance to global shipping and supply chains, thus further accentuating the economic risks posed by persistent regional tensions.
In November, Reuters reported that U.S. container imports fell 7.8 percent amid weakening Chinese demand, signaling further strain in trans-Pacific and global trade flows.
On November 27, officials from Georgia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Romania announced they are ready to sign an agreement to establish a new multimodal Caspian-Black Sea corridor, a transport route linking the Caspian region with the EU via the Black Sea to enhance connectivity, diversify access routes, and strengthen regional logistics and resilience.
Black Sea climbed after Ukrainian naval drones increased their targeting of Russian tankers, raising costs in an already risky and volatile trade corridor for Europe.
On December 11, amid talks between the EU and G7 to replace the current oil price cap mechanism with a blanket ban on Russian access of EU maritime services, Cyprus and Malta warned that tightening sanctions on Russia should not undermine legitimate maritime businesses.
On December 15, it was reported that work on an EU shipping and ports strategy was advancing as Cyprus prepares to assume a larger coordinating role during its upcoming EU presidency.
On December 18, the European Union .expanded sanctions on Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet,” adding 41 vessels to its blacklist to cut off maritime circumvention of energy sanctions and further restrict access to EU ports and services.
At the end of the year, it was reported that China completed a record 14 container ship voyages along the Northern Sea Route between Asia and Europe in 2025, up from 11 such voyages in 2024 and double the amount completed in 2023.
On December 24, international scholars highlighted cooperation in 2025 betweenEuropean and Chinese ports in Piraeus and Hamburg as “win-win” examples of China–Europe economic engagement and supply-chain integration.
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Please note that all news and views cited in this bulletin, if not otherwise indicated, do not represent the position of ICES.