On 2 April, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi held a phone call with EU High Representative Kaja Kallas focused on Middle East maritime security, in which Kallas welcomed China’s diplomatic efforts, and Wang stressed the importance of EU-China cooperation in protecting maritime shipping routes.

On 3 April, a Bahrain-sponsored UN resolution aimed at reopening the Strait of Hormuz was watered down, stripped first of any authorization for offensive force and then of Security Council authorization altogether, in hopes of securing Russian and Chinese abstention rather than a veto.

On 7 April, Russia and China vetoed the watered-down resolution by a vote of 11-2-2; China’s ambassador Fu Cong told the Council the draft failed to capture the conflict’s root causes in a balanced way, while Russia’s ambassador called it a “blank check” for further escalation.

On 2 April, the BBNJ Agreement’s third Preparatory Commission session concluded at UN Headquarters without resolving its rules of procedure, subsidiary-body terms, or financial rules—all three were forwarded to COP1 for resolution, and Brussels remains in the running against Xiamen, China, and Valparaíso, Chile, to host the treaty’s secretariat, with that decision also deferred to COP1.

From 22–23 April, the United Kingdom hosted a conference of 50 countries on a plan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, days after Chinese President Xi Jinping told Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that the strait should remain open to normal navigation.

On 23 April, the European Commission launched its public consultation on the European Ocean Act, which will run until 16 July 2026 as the Commission aims to adopt the legislative proposal—folding in maritime security and defence priorities alongside ocean governance—by the end of 2026.

On 27 April, the EU delivered its statement at the UN Security Council’s High-Level Open Debate on the safety of maritime waterways, reaffirming its commitment to UNCLOS and freedom of navigation and pointing to the importance of unimpeded transit across all of the world’s maritime chokepoints, from the Strait of Hormuz to the South China Sea. In addition, Brussels also flagged increasing risks posed by Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ to critical undersea infrastructure.

At the same UN Security Council meeting, China’s ambassador Fu Cong likewise emphasised the importance of safe and secure shipping routes for global trade and supply chains, but framed the ongoing maritime security challenges primarily as a product of broader geopolitical tensions and governance deficits requiring dialogue, cooperation, and multilateral solutions.

From 27 April–1 May, the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee held its 84th session in London—the first session since the Net-Zero Framework’s adoption was postponed in October 2025 under pressure from Washington. China and the EU were among the IMO members standing firm in support of the Net-Zero Framework despite U.S. threats, and analysis of the session found that a majority of member states now back the framework as originally agreed, reversing the narrow majority that had voted to adjourn discussion in late 2025.

On 1 May, following a Trump administration executive order to fast-track seabed mining permits, the US’ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) determined that The Metals Company’s American subsidiary had met the permitting requirements for operations in a roughly 65,000 km² bloc of the Pacific under a 1980 domestic law that predates—and bypasses—the International Seabed Authority. ISA Secretary-General Leticia Carvalho responded that such unilateral action violates international law and undermines the principle of the seabed as the “common heritage of mankind” enshrined in UNCLOS.

On 6 May, Opinio Juris published an analysis examining the legal implications of Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz under both the law of the sea and the law of naval warfare. It argues that while Iran may lawfully restrict passage by enemy vessels during an armed conflict, customary international law continues to protect the navigational rights of neutral shipping, highlighting the complex interaction between UNCLOS and the law of armed conflict.

On 22 May, Lynn Kuok of the Brookings Institution published an article in Foreign Affairs arguing that the Strait of Hormuz crisis offers important lessons for the Indo-Pacific, where maritime chokepoints are becoming increasingly central to strategic competition. The piece contends that Asia’s growing dependence on secure sea lanes underscores the need for stronger crisis management mechanisms and sustained investment in maritime deterrence.

On 28 May, Japan and the Philippines announced that they would advance maritime delimitation talks regarding waters east of Taiwan, alongside broader commitments to maritime security cooperation, freedom of navigation, and adherence to international law. China protested and derided the “so-called” maritime delimitation as actions which could potentially infringe upon China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, and launched patrols in the area.

Later in June, China defended its patrols to the east of Taiwan after the UK, France, and Germany expressed alarm over what they described as “novel Chinese activity” in the region. Beijing maintained that the operations were lawful and necessary to prevent the “manipulation of maritime delimitation issues and infringement upon China’s maritime rights and interests.”

On 8 June, the Council of the EU adopted its conclusions on the EU Ports Strategy, with member states calling for risk-based, proportionate, non-discriminatory screening to prevent “undue foreign control over critical port infrastructure,” alongside continued efforts to secure fair market access for EU port operators abroad.

On 9 June, Politico reported on the European Commission’s launch of the OceanEye programme, an initiative intended to strengthen European ocean observation capabilities following significant cuts to U.S. federal ocean science funding. The article explores Europe’s efforts to position itself as a global centre for marine research while acknowledging that it cannot fully replace the scale of previous U.S. investment.

On 12 June, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea formed a Special Chamber to hear a maritime boundary delimitation dispute between Ghana and Togo in the Gulf of Guinea, and on 10 June set 2 July as the date for oral proceedings to open in an inquiry brought by the International Seabed Authority concerning Nauru Ocean Resources Inc.

On 18 June, seven new judges were elected to the ITLOS at the 36th Meeting of States Parties to UNCLOS in New York, for nine-year terms beginning in October. The new bench includes jurists from Vietnam, Ghana, Tunisia, India, Brazil, Russia, and the Netherlands—notably Vietnam’s first-ever ITLOS judge, Associate Professor Nguyen Thi Lan Anh.

On 22 June, China’s Consulate General in Cebu formally protested a proposed Cebu City Council resolution that would declare 12 July ‘West Philippine Sea Victory Day,’ marking the 10th anniversary of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration award; the Consulate called the arbitration “a political farce disguised in legal clothing” and argued the underlying dispute concerns sovereignty and delimitation issues outside UNCLOS’s compulsory-arbitration jurisdiction.