Dear ICES friends,
We are delighted to present the latest issue of the quarterly ICES Maritime Bulletin.
The maritime domain has become a new frontier in international affairs, one that holds the potential
for both rivalry and cooperation. Few issues cut across borders as sharply as those tied to the
seas, from fisheries and resources to shipping lanes, climate impacts, maritime security and international
law.
At ICES, we believe that regular knowledge-sharing is essential for transforming
these challenges into opportunities for constructive engagement between Europe, China, and the
wider international community. Every quarter, the ICES Maritime Bulletin brings you the latest
developments, emerging insights, and top event highlights in the maritime sphere. We invite you
to explore the key stories and perspectives shaping this dynamic frontier.
NEWS ROUND
MARITIME DISPUTES & GOVERNANCE
On 2 April, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi
held a phone call
with EU High Representative Kaja Kallas focused on Middle East maritime security, in which
Kallas welcomed China’s diplomatic efforts, and Wang stressed the importance of EU-China
cooperation in protecting maritime shipping routes.
On 3 April, a Bahrain-sponsored
UN resolution aimed at reopening the Strait of Hormuz was
watered down, stripped first of any authorization for offensive force and then of Security Council
authorization altogether, in hopes of securing Russian and Chinese abstention rather
than a veto.
On 7 April, Russia and China
vetoed
the watered-down resolution by a vote of 11-2-2; China’s ambassador Fu Cong told the
Council the draft failed to capture the conflict’s root causes in a balanced way,
while Russia’s ambassador called it a “blank check” for further escalation.
On 2 April, the BBNJ Agreement’s third Preparatory Commission session
concluded
at UN Headquarters without resolving its rules of procedure, subsidiary-body terms, or
financial rules—all three were forwarded to COP1 for resolution, and Brussels remains
in the running against Xiamen, China, and Valparaíso, Chile, to host the treaty’s
secretariat, with that decision also deferred to COP1.
From 22–23 April,
the United Kingdom
hosted a conference
of 50 countries on a plan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, days after Chinese President
Xi Jinping told Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that the strait should remain
open to normal navigation.
On 23 April, the European Commission
launched
its public consultation on the European Ocean Act, which will run until 16 July 2026 as
the Commission aims to adopt the legislative proposal—folding in maritime security
and defence priorities alongside ocean governance—by the end of 2026.
On 27 April, the EU
delivered its statement
at the UN Security Council’s High-Level Open Debate on the safety of maritime waterways,
reaffirming its commitment to UNCLOS and freedom of navigation and pointing to the importance
of unimpeded transit across all of the world’s maritime chokepoints, from the Strait
of Hormuz to the South China Sea. In addition, Brussels also flagged increasing risks
posed by Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ to critical undersea infrastructure.
At the same UN Security Council meeting, China’s ambassador Fu Cong likewise
emphasised
the importance of safe and secure shipping routes for global trade and supply chains,
but framed the ongoing maritime security challenges primarily as a product of broader
geopolitical tensions and governance deficits requiring dialogue, cooperation, and multilateral
solutions.
From 27 April–1 May, the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection
Committee
held its 84th session
in London—the first session since the Net-Zero Framework’s adoption was postponed
in October 2025 under pressure from Washington. China and the EU were among the IMO members
standing firm in support of the Net-Zero Framework despite U.S. threats, and analysis
of the session found that a majority of member states now back the framework as originally
agreed, reversing the narrow majority that had voted to adjourn discussion in late 2025.
On 1 May, following a Trump administration executive order to fast-track seabed
mining permits, the US’ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
determined
that The Metals Company’s American subsidiary had met the permitting requirements
for operations in a roughly 65,000 km² bloc of the Pacific under a 1980 domestic
law that predates—and bypasses—the International Seabed Authority. ISA Secretary-General
Leticia Carvalho
responded
that such unilateral action violates international law and undermines the principle
of the seabed as the “common heritage of mankind” enshrined in UNCLOS.
On 6 May, Opinio Juris published
an analysis
examining the legal implications of Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz under
both the law of the sea and the law of naval warfare. It argues that while Iran may lawfully
restrict passage by enemy vessels during an armed conflict, customary international law
continues to protect the navigational rights of neutral shipping, highlighting the complex
interaction between UNCLOS and the law of armed conflict.
On 22 May, Lynn Kuok
of the Brookings Institution published
an article
in Foreign Affairs arguing that the Strait of Hormuz crisis offers important lessons for
the Indo-Pacific, where maritime chokepoints are becoming increasingly central to strategic
competition. The piece contends that Asia’s growing dependence on secure sea lanes
underscores the need for stronger crisis management mechanisms and sustained investment
in maritime deterrence.
On 28 May, Japan and the Philippines
announced
that they would advance maritime delimitation talks regarding waters east of Taiwan,
alongside broader commitments to maritime security cooperation, freedom of navigation,
and adherence to international law. China
protested and derided
the “so-called” maritime delimitation as actions which could potentially infringe
upon China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, and
launched patrols
in the area.
Later in June, China
defended its patrols
to the east of Taiwan after the UK, France, and Germany expressed alarm over what they
described as “novel Chinese activity” in the region. Beijing maintained that
the operations were lawful and necessary to prevent the “manipulation of maritime
delimitation issues and infringement upon China’s maritime rights and interests.”
On 8 June, the Council of the EU
adopted its conclusions
on the EU Ports Strategy, with member states calling for risk-based, proportionate, non-discriminatory
screening to prevent “undue foreign control over critical port infrastructure,”
alongside continued efforts to secure fair market access for EU port operators abroad.
On March 18, the European Union and Australia
signed
a Security and Defense Partnership. In remarks following the signing, Kaja Kallas, the
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, explicitly linked freedom
of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea,
underscoring the EU’s effort to connect Middle Eastern and Indo-Pacific maritime
security.
On 9 June, Politico
reported
on the European Commission’s launch of the OceanEye programme, an initiative intended
to strengthen European ocean observation capabilities following significant cuts to U.S.
federal ocean science funding. The article explores Europe’s efforts to position
itself as a global centre for marine research while acknowledging that it cannot fully
replace the scale of previous U.S. investment.
On 12 June, the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
formed a Special Chamber
to hear a maritime boundary delimitation dispute between Ghana and Togo in the Gulf of
Guinea, and on 10 June set 2 July as the date for oral proceedings to open in an inquiry
brought by the International Seabed Authority concerning Nauru Ocean Resources Inc.
On 18 June, seven new judges
were elected
to the ITLOS at the 36th Meeting of States Parties to UNCLOS in New York, for nine-year
terms beginning in October. The new bench includes jurists from Vietnam, Ghana, Tunisia,
India, Brazil, Russia, and the Netherlands—notably Vietnam’s
first-ever ITLOS judge, Associate Professor Nguyen Thi Lan Anh.
On 22 June, China’s Consulate
General in Cebu
formally protested
a proposed Cebu City Council resolution that would declare 12 July ‘West Philippine
Sea Victory Day,’ marking the 10th anniversary of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration
award; the Consulate called the arbitration “a political farce disguised in legal
clothing” and argued the underlying dispute concerns sovereignty and delimitation
issues outside UNCLOS’s compulsory-arbitration jurisdiction.
ICES Reflections: On the Adoption and Approval of the EU Ports Strategy
DP World Terminal, NEW Ports Authority via Paul Carmona (CC BY 2.0).
Comment by Alec Caruana, ICES Non-Resident Research Associate
Back when the European Commission published its European Economic Security Strategy in 2023, its stated aim was to “retain openness and commitment to international trade and investment” while addressing what it identified as strategic vulnerabilities in the EU’s exposure to third-country capital. Three years on, those ambitions have acquired concrete regulatory form with the maritime sector serving as one of their most visible testing grounds. On 8 June, transport ministers adopted conclusions on the EU Ports Strategy calling for “risk-based, proportionate and non-discriminatory” screening of foreign investment in critical port infrastructure. The same day, the Council formally adopted a revised Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) screening regulation, closing a patchwork that had, until now, allowed Chinese port investment to be treated quite differently depending on where in the bloc it landed. Both measures sit within a similar logic as the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), which has since 2023 been used to open in-depth investigations into Chinese companies in security scanning, wind energy, and—as of May 2026—a Chinese-led retail acquisition. Despite different premises, these developments illustrate increasing convergence in outcomes regarding European policy addressing both inbound investment risks and external market distortions.
The past three months have seen Beijing respond in kind, and specifically in the maritime domain. China’s revised Maritime Law, which took effect on 1 May, introduced a statutory blocking mechanism for Chinese shipping enterprises against what it terms “discriminatory” foreign measures: Article 308 provides Chinese firms and courts with explicit legal authority to resist compliance where foreign regulatory obligations conflict with Chinese law. Separately, China’s updated Regulations on International Maritime Transport enumerate concrete countermeasures available to the government should Chinese maritime operators, vessels, or seafarers face discriminatory restrictions abroad, including the imposition of special port fees on foreign vessels, restrictions on port access, and limitations on foreign access to Chinese maritime data. With EU-China trade tensions growing across several domains, it is becoming increasingly likely that this instrument-building and deployment will spill over into the maritime sector.
The EU Ports Strategy itself, adopted by the Commission in March 2026 and endorsed by the Council in June, is more measured in its content than the political debate surrounding it might suggest. It sets out four broad directions—security and strategic autonomy, ports as industrial hubs for the energy transition, digital transformation, and infrastructure investment—covering EU ports that collectively handle 74% of Europe’s external trade and 3.4 billion tonnes of goods annually. On the question of foreign investment, the Strategy stops short of prohibition for now: it calls for guidance to be developed by 2028 on how Member States should assess foreign ownership and control in ports identified as strategic dual-use infrastructure, alongside a monitoring framework to map existing and future investments. The Council conclusions of 8 June gave that trajectory political endorsement, but the detailed criteria to distinguish the security-relevant content of different investments remain to be developed. It is the political narrative around the strategy, as much as the strategy itself, that has coloured the relationship.
The two precedents that most shaped that narrative involve the Chinese shipping giant COSCO. First, former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz approved a 24.99% minority stake in a single container terminal in Hamburg in 2022, structured to fall below the threshold for governance or veto rights and with Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG retaining operational and IT control. However, while seemingly innocuous, the German Federal Office for Information Security classified the terminal as critical infrastructure during the secondary review process, a development that exposed the uncertainty of fragmented screening even within Member States and helped to catalyse the push for a more harmonised EU approach. In Greece’s Piraeus, the comparison is materially different: COSCO took majority operational control in 2016 of a facility handling around 680,000 TEUs and ranked 93rd globally; by 2025, it was handling over 5.6 million TEUs and generating record revenues of €251 million, reversing a prolonged period of losses. Critics have raised the question of whether the majority foreign state ownership of a NATO ally’s primary port involves strategic risks that commercial metrics do not capture; proponents point to the same figures to argue that Chinese capital accomplished what European alternatives did not. Both observations can be simultaneously correct, but rarely in dialogue.
These decisions are being made against a commercial backdrop that adds complexity to the calibration task. Chinese shipbuilders captured 84.9% of new global orders in Q1 2026 and hold over 70% of the global containership orderbook; the carriers calling at the terminals under scrutiny are, in the majority of cases, sailing on ships built in Chinese yards. The EU’s own Industrial Maritime Strategy, adopted alongside the Ports Strategy in March, acknowledges this directly, targeting European leadership in high-value specialised segments such as cruise ships, offshore wind vessels, and underwater technologies rather than competing with China on volume. On the trade side, Chinese exports to the EU surged nearly 28% in the first two months of 2026, even as exports to the United States fell sharply. That deepening of commercial integration is one that the EU’s maritime infrastructure, including the terminals at issue in the investment screening debate, is absorbing daily.
The risk for maritime stakeholders in Europe is that the cross-sectoral policy conversation on economic security has moved faster than the technical frameworks needed to support it have. Port infrastructure is, in character, different from many of the other assets the EU’s economic security agenda covers. Unlike data centers or power plants, the commercial value of ports is derived almost entirely from traffic volume—a port that significantly restricts access for security reasons risks neutralising the economic rationale for the investment it is trying to protect. That does not mean ownership is irrelevant: the distinction between a majority acquisition of a primary national port and a minority financial stake in a single terminal is real, and the 2028 guidance will need to articulate it clearly. But the legal architectures now being constructed on both sides—the EU’s layered screening and subsidy-control instruments, China’s countermeasure framework for the maritime sector—are being built at a pace that is outrunning the evidence base required to deploy them proportionately. The Commission’s first statutory review of the FSR (due in July 2026) is the most immediate opportunity to assess whether the instruments as currently configured are capturing the distinctions they were designed to capture, or whether the current trajectory is producing a legal escalation in the maritime sector that neither the commercial data nor the granular risk assessments will fully justify.
MARITIME ECONOMY
On 3 April, CMA CGM’s Malta-flagged container ship Kribi
became
the first Western-owned vessel known to transit the Strait of Hormuz since its closure, alongside
three Oman-linked tankers and a Japanese-owned gas carrier; the ship broadcast its French ownership
on AIS before entering Iranian waters, the same tactic several Chinese vessels had already used
by flagging their destination as “Chinese owner & crew.”
On 9 April,
Shanghai Waigaoqiao and Guangzhou Shipyard International
signed
new Suezmax tanker contracts with Greek owner Venergy Maritime, part of a wave of orders industry
figures attributed to China’s integrated industrial and supply-chain advantages.
On 17 April, China’s retaliatory port-fee tier
took effect, with fees on US-linked vessels calling at Chinese ports rising to roughly RMB 640 (about
$90) per net ton, with further increases due in 2027 and 2028, as part of the tit-for-tat response
to the U.S. Section 301 shipping action.
On 11 May, it was reported that Chinese
shipbuilders
won
an 84.9% share of new global orders in Q1 2026—nearly double year-on-year—leaving
South Korea (12.8%) and Japan (1.4%) far behind.
In early June, Maersk’s
Europe Market Update
flagged persistent congestion at Rotterdam and Antwerp, while noting Hormuz shipping conditions
had not yet meaningfully improved—published just two weeks before the breakthrough below.
On 4 June, Drewry’s World Container Index
rose 23% week-on-week, driven by sharp increases on major east-west trade lanes. The surge reflected an earlier-than-usual
peak season, stronger demand, and continued uncertainty in global shipping conditions, adding
further pressure on shippers already facing disruption from the Strait of Hormuz crisis.
On 17 June,
the Strait of Hormuz reopened
after Trump and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding at Versailles; five of the first seven
vessels to transit were Chinese-linked, including a Hong Kong-flagged COSCO tanker that had
been stranded for over 100 days, in addition to a France-flagged LNG carrier.
On
24 June, Trump
claimed
Iran had assured the U.S. there would be no tolls on the Strait of Hormuz after Iran and Oman
jointly announced they would begin working out an agreement on the “services” and
associated “costs” of navigating the strait.
On 25 June, crude shipments through the Strait of Hormuz reached their highest level since
the war began, with around 36 tankers transiting on 22 June alone and roughly 20 million
barrels of crude
exiting the strait in a single 24-hour period, according to the U.S. Energy Secretary—still
only a fraction of the pre-war daily average of about 125 ships, with most traffic hugging the
Omani side of the strait rather than the mined and unusable central channel.
On 26
June, the IMO’s secretary-general
said
that roughly 115 vessels and 2,500 seafarers had been evacuated from the Strait of Hormuz over
the preceding three and a half days under the UN-Oman evacuation framework for the more than
11,000 mariners still stranded in the Gulf following the US-Iran ceasefire and MoU.
On 29 June, the European Commission
confirmed
that the EU would introduce a temporary €3 customs duty on low-value parcels entering the
bloc from 1 July, primarily affecting the rapidly expanding e-commerce sector and small-parcel
flows that frequently connect Europe and China.
MARITIME SECURITY
On 1 April, Japan’s Coast Guard
detected
the Chinese research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 27 operating equipment in waters near the Diaoyu
(Senkaku) islands, followed the next day by several China Coast Guard vessels in the same waters—the
latest episode in the two countries’ long-running, unresolved dispute over the islands’
status. While Japan said the vessel was conducting unauthorized activity within its claimed
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and demanded that it cease operations, China
described its actions
as lawful rights-protection and enforcement activities in waters under Chinese jurisdiction.
On 13 April, U.S. Southern Command
said it had killed
two “narco-terrorists” in a strike on an alleged drug-trafficking boat in the eastern
Pacific, bringing the death toll from this campaign to at least 170 since strikes began the
previous September.
On 24 April, the USS Abraham Lincoln, USS Gerald R. Ford, and USS George H.W. Bush were
operating simultaneously in the Middle East for the first time since 2003, together fielding
over 200 aircraft and
15,000 sailors and Marines, as CENTCOM reported the naval blockade had by then redirected 34
Iranian-bound vessels.
On 2 May, the USS Gerald R. Ford
departed the Middle East
region after a deployment of more than 10 months—the longest in modern US Navy history.
On 4 May, Maersk’s Farrell Lines subsidiary confirmed its US-flagged vehicle carrier
Alliance Fairfax exited the Persian Gulf via the strait under
U.S. military escort, one of two American-flagged vessels to transit as part of Washington’s ‘Project
Freedom’ effort and the first U.S.-flagged vessel to clear the strait since the war effectively
closed it.
Later in May, a US Coast Guard cutter joined Philippine naval and coast
guard vessels for their first-ever
joint maritime cooperative operation
at Scarborough Shoal, amid Manila’s concerns over potential Chinese construction at the
contested feature. Beijing
characterised
the U.S.-Philippine activities as a “provocative act” in the South China Sea, and
said its own patrols represented countermeasures to protect China’s maritime rights.
On 8 June, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas
announced
that Operation IRINI, the EU’s Mediterranean naval mission, had updated its rules of engagement
to allow boarding and inspection of vessels suspected of belonging to Russia’s sanctions-evading
‘shadow fleet,’ building on a string of national seizures over recent months. When
prompted for comment, China’s foreign ministry called on both parties “to find solutions
through dialogue and consultation” and reiterated its opposition to “illicit unilateral
sanctions.”
On 9 June, the Philippines
protested
the deployment of a floating structure with Chinese personnel at Scarborough Shoal, warning
that the move could alter the status quo at the contested feature. China
rejected
the concerns, reiterating that Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal) is Chinese territory and that
activities there, including scientific research, were lawful exercises of China’s rights.
On 14 June, Royal Marine Commandos and National Crime Agency officers
boarded
the sanctioned tanker Smyrtos in UK waters in a six-hour operation, a Cameroonian-flagged vessel
carrying 700,000 barrels of Russian crude, recorded as owned by a Hong Kong-registered firm—the
UK’s first such interdiction of Russia’s shadow fleet.
MARITIME EVENTS
Over the past quarter, the ICES has convened several events with maritime implications. We are delighted to share some of our insights.
On 10 and 11 June 2026, ICES, in partnership with the Institute for Security and Development
Policy (ISDP), the National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS) and the Institute
for China-America Studies (ICAS) was proud to host its inaugural 2026 Annual Conference:
‘EU-China Relations in an Era of Great Power Competition and Global Order Reconfiguration.’
The conference’s third panel, Shared Horizons: Managing EU-China Ties through
Ocean Stewardship, examined the prospects for cooperation in an increasingly competitive
maritime relationship. Held under Chatham House Rules, speakers discussed developments
in the South China Sea, the Arctic, and key maritime chokepoints, as well as identifying
opportunities for pragmatic EU-China cooperation on ocean governance, marine scientific
research, implementation of the BBNJ Agreement, and the decarbonisation of shipping.
The recording of the open conference is available
here on our website and on our YouTube channel.
On 18 June 2026, ICES was pleased to host a webinar bringing together leading European
and Chinese scholars to examine the future of the international legal order for the oceans.
Against a backdrop of growing geopolitical competition, maritime security challenges,
and technological change, the discussion explored how the EU and China can contribute
to maintaining a stable, rules-based framework for the world’s oceans.
The discussion examined a range of contemporary maritime legal issues, including the
Strait of Hormuz, submarine cable governance, deep-sea mining, and the continued evolution
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Speakers explored differing European
and Chinese perspectives while highlighting areas where continued dialogue, legal certainty,
and practical cooperation remain both possible and necessary. The webinar offered valuable
insights into the legal and policy debates shaping the future of global ocean governance.
If you were unable to join the discussion live, the full recording is available
on our YouTube channel.
CONTACT WITH US
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Please note that all news and views cited in this bulletin, if not otherwise indicated, do not represent the position of ICES.