Photo by Kurt Cotoaga on Unsplash
Commentary by Daniel Balazs, Senior Research Analyst, Institute for China-Europe Studies
May 18, 2026
The May 2026 Xi-Trump summit prioritised "constructive strategic stability", shifting toward a pragmatic management of China-US ties that focuses on cooperation, but also includes limited competition. For Europe, the spillover effect is that China is more prepared to deploy regulatory countermeasures, suggesting that trade frictions between Beijing and Brussels may intensify.
On 14–15 May 2026, US President Donald J. Trump conducted a state visit to China for a
high-stakes summit with his counterpart, President Xi Jinping. The dialogue spanned critical
issues, including trade, technology, and regional security. While the meetings produced some tangible results, such as a Chinese order for US-manufactured Boeing aircraft, the broader outcomes remain opaque. Washington has issued specific claims regarding the successes of the trip, yet these have often been met with less straightforward confirmations from Beijing.
Despite the bilateral nature of the summit, its consequences extend well beyond the Pacific.
European leaders watched with a degree of concern, cautious of a possible "grand bargain" between
the world's two largest economies that might sacrifice the continent's interests. While such a
sweeping agreement did not emerge, the summit's subtler outcomes may imply a prospective shift in
China-EU relations. One of the most significant takeaways from the meeting was not a commercial
deal, but President Xi's introduction of a new formulation for China-US ties. This shift in
rhetoric indicates that Europe has to be prepared to deal with a China that is increasingly
willing to push back against Brussels' measures that Beijing perceives as discriminatory and protectionist.
The summit took place against a complex backdrop. Since the commencement of the second Trump
administration, trade tensions have escalated, with both sides exchanging aggressive tariff
threats that, at their peak, exceeded 100 per cent. Furthermore, China's decisions last year to
restrict exports of rare earths and magnets—components essential to everything from domestic
appliances to smartphones—sent a shock through global industrial supply chains. While officials
have engaged in a series of meetings, these efforts have managed to secure only a temporary
solution on this front, a one-year trade truce. This pause maintains the flow of goods at
reduced rates but fails to address the underlying structural disagreements.
In this climate, analysts maintained cautious expectations. It was widely predicted that the
summit would cover geopolitical flashpoints like Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Taiwan
Strait, alongside trade and technology. However, few expected definitive breakthroughs. These
modest expectations were largely met. An institutional outcome was the establishment of the
Board of Trade and the Board of Investment – referred to by China as the Trade Council and
Investment Council – to manage future interactions. On the commercial front, the US claimed China
had committed to purchasing billions of dollars in American agricultural products. However, with
Chinese official communication remaining sparse on specifics, the summit was characterised as
being more about "vibes than details."
A very consequential delivery of the summit was intangible. During the meeting on 14 May,
President Xi unveiled a new vision for the bilateral relationship: 'constructive strategic
stability'. This concept appears to denote a framework where cooperation remains dominant but
exists alongside limited competition and managed differences. This phrasing represents a subtle
yet profound shift in Beijing's framing of its relationship with Washington.
Under the Obama administration, China advocated for a new type of major power relations,
which sought to avoid the historical trap of great-power conflict by focusing almost exclusively
on shared interests. Similarly, during President Trump's first state visit in 2017, the emphasis
remained on dialogue and the elimination of differences. The pivot towards incorporating managed
friction into the narrative suggests that Beijing now views competition not only as a hurdle to
be cleared, but also as a feature of the landscape to be managed.
The absence of a China-US grand bargain provides some relief to Europe, yet the summit suggests
that the status quo in China-EU relations is evolving. Currently, Beijing's approach to Europe is
bifurcated. It advocates for cooperation while simultaneously deploying trade defence measures,
such as import tariffs on European pork, dairy, and brandy. Because relations with EU
institutions in Brussels remain strained, Beijing frequently leverages its bilateral ties with
individual member states to enhance its relationship with the region.
For its part, the EU appears committed to its "de-risking" agenda. Brussels is reportedly
preparing to intensify this strategy by initiating more investigations into Chinese companies and
implementing restrictive measures to rebalance economic relations. However, President Xi's
reference to managed differences and limited competition signals that China is unlikely to retreat
from trade confrontations. Although the term was used in a China-US context, it may spill over
and impact China-EU ties as well.
Such an example occurred on 15 May, coinciding with the Trump visit. China's justice ministry
ordered Chinese entities to cease cooperation with the EU's foreign subsidy probe into Nuctech,
a security technology firm. Invoking recently passed regulations against "unlawful extraterritorial
jurisdiction", Beijing argued that the EU's demands for data located within China were excessive
and arbitrary. This defiance directly challenges the EU's ability to conclude its investigation
and may force the European Commission to decide whether to impose redressive measures in the face
of highly probable Chinese non-compliance.
The Nuctech case serves as an early indicator of how constructive strategic stability may function
in practice. By shielding its firms from foreign regulatory overreach, China is demonstrating
that managed competition does not exclude friction. With similar EU investigations pending into
other firms, such as Goldwind Science & Technology, more flashpoints are almost inevitable.
While public attention naturally gravitated toward the numbers in aircraft and agriculture deals,
the true legacy of the May summit lies in this shift in tone. As both the EU and China accelerate
the development of regulations to protect their markets and autonomy, the era of managed
competition between China and the EU might involve a period of intensifying trade friction that
will test the resilience of global commerce.
Please note that views expressed by the author do not reflect the policies or positions of
ICES. The views expressed by the author are personal and do not reflect the policies or
positions of his affiliated institutions.