Source: European Commission
Commentary by Isabell Raue, Research Assistant, ICES
October 20, 2025
The second Global Gateway Forum in October 2025 highlighted the EU’s attempt to promote a values-driven, multilateral model of global connectivity as a normative alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. While showcasing deepening partnerships, a sustainable agenda, and private-sector mobilisation, comparisons with the Chinese approach and its narrative ambitions also display the need for stronger priorities, visibility, clear norm-based governance, and multilateral engagement.
The second Global Gateway Forum took place in Brussels from October 9 to October 10, 2025,
bringing together different high-level representatives from the governments, business,
academia, and civil society. It served as a dialogue platform, retrospection and policy
showcase for the EU’s flagship connectivity strategy. Panels
included themes such as State of the World, Looking at Connectivity through a Geostrategic Lens,
and Strategising Partnerships.
The Global Gateway Initiative
The Global Gateway Initiative was launched in 2021 by the European Commission and
the EU High Representative. It was implemented to counter the idea that the EU had become a
‘payer but not a player’
globally, to enhance its influence and meet the needs of the receiving countries. It promotes smart,
clean, and secure links in five
key areas: digital, climate and energy, transport, health, and education and research. These areas are
built around the guiding principles of resilience, sustainability, and like-minded
partnerships. The initiative “stands for sustainable and trusted connections that work for people and the planet”, aligning closely with the UN’s 2030 Agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the
Paris Agreement. In 2025, the Global Gateway
surpassed the goal of mobilising 300 billion euros
in investments by uniting EU institutions, Member States, development banks, and private investors
under the
Team Europe
approach.
Forums 2025: From Parallel Initiatives to Competing Visions
The implementation of the Global Gateway was not only a reaction to the global
infrastructure investment deficit but was also
triggered by Chinese efforts
under the framework of the
Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), launched by President Xi in 2013 to
improve economic cooperation
and, as analysts have repeatedly noted, to
address Chinese overcapacities. The recent forum, four years after the Global Gateway’s implementation, emphasised the
progress in establishing
clearer themes
and enhancing investment structures. This is a small but essential step in response to repeated
criticism regarding a
lack of coherence,
ineffective execution, and
limited European resources and unity.
The Belt and Road Forum 2023, this year’s Meeting of their Advisory Council and
the Global Gateway Forum in 2025 highlighted how China and the EU are shaping parallel yet
increasingly interlinked visions of global connectivity. The Belt and Road Forum emphasised
Beijing’s effort to reposition the large-scale BRI as a
high-quality cooperation platform, focusing on digitalisation, technology, green finance, and local partnerships. Meanwhile,
the Global Gateway Forum projected the EU’s initiative as a values-driven, transparent, and
sustainable
alternative, centred on rules-based governance and successful
private-sector mobilisation through the Team Europe
approach. Yet, the forums also revealed growing complementarity between the initiatives, promoting
multilateral coordination, green and digital projects, and Global South engagement, as well as a broader contest of
norms and overarching visions.
Connectivity Narratives to Shape Multilateralism
The shared vocabulary of “partnerships” and “mutual benefit” comprises a contest for influence, visibility, and norm-setting in a world shifting towards
multilateralism. The Belt and Road forums reaffirm China’s
long-term ambition
to consolidate the BRI as the
primary
global infrastructure network. Beijing has
included and aligned its communication
on the BRI with its
communication of the Chinese global governance approach, framing it within its inclusive and civilisational, ‘win-win’ narrative. BRI is
integrated in the broader framework
of the ‘Four Global Initiatives’, projecting China as a guardian of the Global South’s development
autonomy. The ‘common development’ and ‘common prosperity’ narrative is
part of ‘telling China’s story well’. Beijing’s rhetoric emphasises its pragmatic multilateralism vision, with
South-South solidarity
and respect for diverging development paths. Addressing the BRI
criticisms, it shifted to a portrait of China as a stable, long-term partner in global governance.
The Global Gateway Forum’s
theme
‘Advancing global connectivity in the face of geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges’, the
background paper
‘Partnerships in a Geopolitical Era: Time for a New Strategic Conversation’, and the launch of
the Global Gateway Investment Hub and deepened partnership with the
World Bank Group
openly acknowledge that the Global Gateway is advancing
geopolitical
and
geoeconomic
interests. Surrounding the 2025 forum, the EU has deepened its rhetorical framing of the Global
Gateway, linking sustainable investment with
transparency,
multilateral
structures and
mutual benefit. Brussels presents connectivity as a
normative project, positioning the EU as a
trusted partner
and implementing projects based on
multilateral commitments
and multi-actor engagement. This communicative effort displays the European
self-reflection
as a principled actor in an emerging multilateral world order.
Both narratives
highlight different aspects but reveal a rhetorical convergence: although the connectivity
initiatives differ in terms of values and communication, they have become platforms for the EU
and China to further define multilateralism and their role in the
emerging order, and shape
profound international partnerships
by creating multilateral
platforms of cooperation. The narrative competition for standard-setting and norms raises questions about
which form of development
should be prioritised and how to build mechanisms for responsible coexistence that advance the
respective governance norms and partnerships.
Policy Implications
The latest BRI and Global
Gateway forums highlighted the increasing competition over influence in global standards and
governance models. Against the background of
fragmented Western infrastructure finance, the Global Gateway cannot and should not attempt to match the scale of the BRI. However, it
could bring meaning by offering value-driven and reliable European governance based on
mutually beneficial partnerships at eye level.
For the Global Gateway Forum, the
next step should be to consolidate its image as a strategic platform rather than a symbolic
gathering with a limited audience and sparse journalistic coverage. To mitigate dependencies,
connect with like-minded partners amid the transatlantic divide, and shape multilateralist
fora, the European narratives surrounding the Global Gateway must not only be told effectively
but must also be heard. To improve its visibility and reception among partner countries, the
EU must better define core priorities, communicate tangible results (also in the Member
States), and build on its normative strengths. While the latest forum revealed some
improvements with regard to
priorities
and financing, the EU needs stronger internal coordination, a united presence at the forum, and
clearer political goal-setting that aims to understand overlapping interests with partner countries
and to support their enabling environments.
A coherent, strategically conveyed
narrative that aligns EU strengths and geopolitical objectives, understanding the Global
Gateway as a
structural pillar of multilateral engagement, could improve its recognition as a serious global player. Instead of attempting to compete
with China and demanding that receiving countries take sides, the EU should define a clear
role and vision that maximises the Global Gateway’s impact and treats the connectivity
projects as global goods and shared responsibilities.
Please note that views expressed by the author do not reflect the policies or positions of ICES.