Treasure or Trouble? The Deep Seabed Mining Dilemma

Hainan

Source: NOAA Office of Ocean Exploration and Research, 2016 Deepwater Exploration of the Marianas

Commentary by Danel van Mensel, Intern, ICES

August 26, 2025

As the International Seabed Authority (ISA) concluded its 30th Assembly in Kingston from July 21-25, 2025, the outcome was clear: no exploitation licenses have been approved, and the much-anticipated Mining Code remains incomplete. Member states reaffirmed that commercial deep seabed mining cannot proceed without robust regulations and sufficient scientific knowledge.

Deep seabed mining (DSM) refers to the extraction of mineral resources - such as cobalt, nickel, manganese, and rare earth elements - from the ocean floor, typically at depths of 4,000 to 6,000 meters. These minerals are essential for clean energy and defence technologies, as well as for AI development. Most DSM activity targets polymetallic nodules found in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone of the Pacific Ocean, located beyond any country’s national jurisdiction. As such, DSM falls under the legal authority of the ISA, which is mandated by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to regulate exploration and exploitation in the international seabed area (“the Area”) for the benefit of all humanity.

Once a hypothetical opportunity and challenge for future generations, DSM is now very much a live issue. Triggered by Nauru’s invocation of the “two-year rule” in 2021, the ISA has been under mounting pressure to finalize its Mining Code and respond to the first potential commercial applications for exploitation. That deadline technically expired two years ago - yet no exploitation license has been granted. With the absence of an agreed-upon Mining Code, the recent session reiterated that mining cannot commence without a complete regulatory framework.

At stake is not just a technical rulebook, but the very principle that the seabed beyond national jurisdiction constitutes the “common heritage of mankind” - a cornerstone of the UNCLOS. In an era of growing demand for critical minerals essential to the green transition, that principle is being tested like never before.

On one end of the spectrum, China has embedded itself firmly within the ISA framework. As the largest holder of exploration contracts and an active participant in rule-drafting, it champions a rules-based yet strategically pragmatic approach. On the other, the United States - still outside UNCLOS - has opted for an openly unilateral path. A 2025 Executive Order by President Trump encourages U.S. companies to begin mining under alternative sponsorship arrangements, primarily through small island states like Nauru and Tonga. This risks fragmenting the legal framework underpinning deep seabed governance.

In between lies the European Union, which has increasingly aligned itself with the global environmental community calling for a moratorium or at least a precautionary pause. Eleven EU Member States, alongside the European Parliament, now oppose DSM in the absence of robust scientific and legal safeguards. While Europe also needs critical minerals, its strategy emphasizes circularity, recycling, and terrestrial alternatives - an approach that positions the EU as a cautious guardian rather than an eager extractor.

Norway, by contrast, continues to maintain a more pragmatic position on deep seabed mining. Unlike much of the EU, it has not called for a full moratorium and has argued that Europe's reluctance could result in falling behind countries like China that are accelerating their seabed resource programs. Norway supports accelerated negotiations under the ISA, but with careful environmental safeguards rather than blanket delays.

The 30th Assembly represents progress in strengthening the ISA’s institutional framework, but the Authority remains at a decisive juncture. The path forward is clear: finalize a Mining Code grounded in rigorous environmental safeguards, equitable benefit-sharing, and transparent governance, or risk ceding authority to unilateral actors whose actions could erode multilateral ocean governance.

For Europe and China, this moment presents both a challenge and an opportunity. As major economic actors with significant stakes in critical minerals, they could choose to jointly champion a science-first, rules-based framework that ensures DSM proceeds, if at all, as a carefully regulated global endeavour. While such collaboration may appear ambitious given their differing strategic priorities, even limited alignment could enhance the ISA’s credibility and help safeguard the Area from becoming a new domain of unregulated resource exploitation.